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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN NYREHN, : 
: Court of Appeals 
Applicant/Petitioner, : 
: Case No. 900010CA 
vs. : 
: Category No. 6 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL : 
COMMISSION, FRED MEYER : 
STORES and/or LIBERTY MUTUAL : 
INSURANCE, and EMPLOYERS1 : 
REINSURANCE FUND, : 
Defendants, Respondents. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER KATHLEEN NYREHN 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review an order of the Utah State Industrial Commission 
pursuant to Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for review of an order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue presented for review on appeal is as 
follows: 
1. Did Kathleen Nyrehn suffer a compensable industrial 
accident while employed by Fred Meyer Stores on January 23, 
1985. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-82.53. Review of order of 
administrative law judge or commission - Effect of supple-
mental order of administrative law judge. 
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the 
order entered by an administrative law judge or the commis-
sion may file a motion for review of such order. Upon the 
filing of such motion to review his order the administrative 
law judge may (a) reopen the case and enter a supplemental 
order after holding such further hearing and receiving such 
further evidence as he may deem necessary; or (b) amend or 
modify his prior order by a supplemental order; or (c) refer 
the entire case to the commission. If the administrative law 
judge makes a supplemental order, as provided above, it shall 
be final unless a motion to review the same shall be filed 
with the commission. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-82.54. Review of cases and 
orders by commission - Procedure - Effect of award. 
The commission, upon referral of a case to it by an 
administrative law judge, or upon a motion being filed with 
it to review its own order, or an administrative law judgefs 
supplemental order, shall review the entire record made in 
said case, and, in its discretion, may hold further hearings 
and receive further evidence, and make findings of fact and 
enter its award thereon. The award of the commission shall 
be final unless set aside by the Supreme Court as hereinafter 
provided. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Nyrehn prevailed b€>fore the Administrative Law 
Judge in her application for benefits. She was not required 
to file a Motion for Review to preserve her right to appeal. 
The Utah State Industrial Commission did not apply 
the correct standard of legal causation when reviewing the 
employment activities of the applicant. The Commission ruled 
that an employee with a preexisting impairment had the burden 
of proving that an injury resulted from an unusual or 
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extraordinary exertion. Repetitive exertions and strains 
will satisfy the legal causation standard for workers with 
preexisting conditions as the sedentary, non-employment life 
of a worker does not include repetitive exertions and 
strains. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MS. NYREHN DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
Ms. Nyrehn prevailed before the Administrative Law 
Judge in her application for benefits in which she claimed 
that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of 
an industrial accident. The Administrative Law Judge awarded 
to her compensation at the rate of $78.00 per week for the 
remainder of her life. He also ordered the respondent to pay 
for reasonable medical treatment for petitioner's work 
related injuries. The employer has argued in its brief that 
Ms. Nyrehn should have filed a Motion for Review of this 
Order to the Utah State Industrial Commission pursuant to 
Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.53, Utah 
Code Ann, provides as follows: 
(1) Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with 
the Order entered by an Administrative Law Judge 
may seek review of that Order with the Commission 
by complying with the Commission's rules governing 
that review. 
(2) The Order of the Commission on review is 
final, unless set aside by the Court of Appeals. 
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Ms. Nyrehn was not dissatisfied with the Order 
entered by the Administrative Law Judge as he awarded to her 
precisely the benefits which she was seeking. The applicant 
may not have concurred with the legal foundation for the 
ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and she may not have 
concurred with the Findings of Fact made by the Administra-
tive Law Judge. However, the result obtained was favorable 
to her. The Administrative Law Judge commented at the 
conclusion of the hearing: 
One final note for the record, I recognize that the 
issue will be appealed and I want to caution Ms. 
Nyrehn to some respect. I don't want you to go out 
thinking you won the total war. You have just won 
one battle and I would imagine the bigger war will 
be waged at the higher courts. (R. 49) 
The Workers Compensation Act does not provide that 
a party dissatisfied with the Findings of Fact of an Admin-
istrative Law Judge must file a Motion for Review. Such a 
provision, if in our statute, would further burden an 
already burdened system. When a Motion for Review is filed 
from an Order of an Administrative Law Judge, the Commission 
reviews the entire record and it may make its own findings of 
fact and enter its award thereon. U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980). 
This matter is not controlled by the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act as it was commenced prior to January 1, 1988. 
Accordingly, the Utah State Industrial Commission reviews the 
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Order of the Administrative Law Judge pursuant to Section 3 5-
1-82.54, Utah Code Ann. (1975) (Repealed in 1987, repeal 
effective January 1, 1988.) U.S.X. Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 781 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this case, the Commission reviewed the Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge and reversed it and issued the 
following Order: 
The application for hearing of the applicant, 
Kathleen Nyrehn, is hereby dismissed with pre-
judice, the applicant having failed to show that 
he (sic) suffered a compensable industrial accident 
in that he (sic) failed to establish that the 
injury was the result of unusual extraordinary 
(sic) as per Allen v. Industrial Commission where 
the applicant suffered from a preexisting condi-
tion. 
The Industrial Commission did not make new findings of fact 
but adopted certain findings of fact of the Administrative 
Law Judge. It is from these findings of fact and the Order 
of the Commission that the applicant takes her appeal. 
Cases cited by the employer for its position that 
the applicant had waived her right to appeal are those in 
which the applicant did not prevail before the Administrative 
Law Judge and was dissatisfied with the Order of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge. See, Pease v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984), U.S.X. Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, supra. 
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POINT II 
THE APPLICANT DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN OF 
PROVING THAT HER INJURY RESULTED FROM AN 
UNUSUAL, EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION. 
The Commission in its Order dismissed the appli-
cant's petition for the reason that the applicant failed to 
demonstrate that her injury was the result of "unusual 
extraordinary (exertion).11 The employer in its brief cites 
language of the Administrative Law Judge who commented at the 
hearing as follows: 
Lifting tubs weighing 15 to 40 pounds 3 6 times or 
72 times, is not the crucial issue. It is whether 
something unusual happened, some extraordinary 
exertion happened, and in this case, the applicant 
has failed to establish that. (R. 458) 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 198 6), the Utah Supreme Court adopted legal and medical 
causation tests to be applied in determining whether an 
industrial accident is compensable. Workers with preexisting 
conditions must show that their employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk of injury which 
such workers already face in everyday life because of their 
preexisting condition. The Utah Supreme Court adopted an 
objective standard of comparison. The exertion of the 
injured worker is compared to typical non-employment ac-
tivities generally expected by people in today's society. 
The Supreme Court did not define the typical non-employment 
activities, but suggested: 
6 
The case law will eventually define a standard for 
typical non-employment activity in much the way 
case law has developed the standard of care for the 
reasonable man in tort law. 
729 P.2d at 27. 
The exertion engaged in by the worker suffering a 
preexisting injury need only be sufficient to demonstrate 
that the risk of harm faced by the injured worker at his 
employment is greater than the risk of harm he already faced 
in everyday life because of the preexisting condition. Allen 
v. Industrial Commission. 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Utah State 
Industrial Commission imposed on the applicant the burden of 
demonstrating that she engaged in unusual, extraordinary 
exertion. Although it is true that unusual, extraordinary 
exertion satisfies the legal causation test of Allen, it is 
not the exclusive test for legal causation for workers with 
preexisting injuries. 
The applicant asserts that the repetitive bending, 
stooping and lifting in the course of one's employment 
satisfies the legal causation standard for workers with 
preexisting conditions. Despite the forecast in Allen, the 
case law has yet to define a standard for typical "non-
employment activity." Other jurisdictions which have adopted 
the dual causation standard have not required an applicant to 
demonstrate that the exertion causing the injury was unusual 
or extraordinary. Guidrv v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., 
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418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982), cited by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission at footnote 7. 
Mr. Guidry died from a heart attack while resting 
during a break from his employment. Mr. Guidry was employed 
as an industrial painter. He had a history of athero-
sclerotic heart disease. On the day of his death, he 
reported to work at 7:30 a.m. as usual. He and a co-worker: 
"were assigned the task of painting large rolling 
doors on a warehouse. They were using a single 
ladder ten to twelve feet tall. The top portions 
of the doors which were out of reach to a painter 
working on the ground were painted by [Mr. Guidryfs 
co-worker], Guidryfs roll being to brace the ladder 
to assure [his co-worker's] safety and to move the 
ladder as required. The areas of the door acces-
sible from the ground were painted by the two men. 
The pair had worked non-stop from 7:30 a.m. until 
the noon break, with only a ten minute break during 
that time at 10:00 a.m. The pair again commenced 
working after the lunch break and worked until 
approximately 2:00 p.m." 
Guidry v, Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d at 634. 
During his afternoon break, Mr. Guidry suffered a heart 
attack. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that Mr. 
Guidry: 
"had performed physical and fairly strenuous 
exertion for most of the day. He had returned to 
his duties right after lunch and continued to work 
until minutes before the attack. Our appreciation 
of the evidence in this case prompts us to conclude 
that Guidryfs activities while working on the 
fateful day of his heart attack, were marked by 
stress, exertion and strain greater than that 
generated in everyday non-employment life, and 
greater than that generated in the more or less 
sedentary life of the average non-worker." 
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418 So.2d at 634. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in Guidry focused on 
the activity of the decedent throughout the day and concluded 
that it was marked by repeated exertions and repeated 
strains. No one exertion was unusual or extraordinary but in 
combination Mr. Guidry1s activities exceeded those engaged in 
by the average non-worker in his or her non-employment life. 
In Allen, the Supreme Court noted certain typical 
non-employment activities, i.e., taking out the garbage cans, 
lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat 
tire, lifting a small child to chest height and climbing the 
stairs in buildings. Each of these activities is an isolated 
event which alone would not satisfy the legal causation 
standard. However, if one engaged in these activities 
regularly and repetitively throughout an eight hour day, this 
conduct would satisfy the legal causation standard for 
workers with preexisting conditions. The sedentary, non-
employment life of a worker does not include repetitive 
exertions and strains. It includes occasional exertions and 
strains. 
Ms. Nyrehn's employer has argued that the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge considered the applicant's employment 
activities when ruling that her employment activities did not 
satisfy the legal causation standard of Allen. The Findings 
of Fact issued by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by 
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the Utah State Industrial Commission demonstrate that the 
analysis engaged in by the Judge and the Commission was 
limited to comparing the weight of the tubs lifted by Ms. 
Nyrehn to the weight of the object lifted by the injured 
worker in Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission, 77 0 
P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989). This limited analysis is flawed. 
It fails to consider the repetitive activities engaged in by 
the applicant in her employment. It fails to compare these 
activities to everyday non-employment life. It is this 
failure that renders the decision of the Commission 
unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Nyrehn submits that the decision of the Utah 
State Industrial Commission denying her benefits should be 
reversed and the case should be remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for further hearing. 
DATED this j( day of May, 1990. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
William W. Downes, Jr. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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